This article explores a set of questions about the ‘idea of freedom’ that Kant introduces in the fourth paragraph of Groundwork III. I develop a reading that supports treating it as a normative notion and brings out its normative content in some detail. I argue that we should understand the idea as follows: that it is a general feature of reasoning and judgement that it understands itself to be a correct or sound application of the normative standards of the relevant (...) domain of cognition, not influenced by irrelevant or external factors. Reasoning and judgement are thus normatively committed to these standards of correctness. A second and related concern is to explore connections between the idea of freedom and Kant’s conception of autonomy and to identify different points at which autonomy plays a role in the argument of Groundwork III. In the final section, I mine the idea of freedom for a set of normative commitments specific to rational agency that play a foundational role in Kant’s moral conception. (shrink)

This paper develops an interpretation of what is essential to kant's doctrine of the highest good, Which defends it while also explaining why it is often rejected. While it is commonly viewed as a theological ideal in which happiness is proportioned to virtue, The paper gives an account in which neither feature appears. The highest good is best understood as a state of affairs to be achieved through human agency, Containing the moral perfection of all individuals and the satisfaction of (...) their permissible ends-I.E., One in which all act from the moral law and in doing so achieve their intended ends. The paper shows that the texts contain two distinct conceptions not distinguished by kant-Both a theological and a secular (political) notion. The standard objections apply to the theological, But the secular conception is consistent with kant's conception of moral conduct. Moreover, That the highest good is introduced as an end to be constructed out of the moral law indicates that the secular version is the essential notion. (shrink)

The essays in this volume offer an approach to the history of moral and political philosophy that takes its inspiration from John Rawls. All the contributors are philosophers who have studied with Rawls and they offer this collection in his honour. The distinctive feature of this approach is to address substantive normative questions in moral and political philosophy through an analysis of the texts and theories of major figures in the history of the subject: Aristotle, Hobbes, Hume, Rousseau, Kant and (...) Marx. By reconstructing the core of these theories in a way that is informed by contemporary theoretical concerns, the contributors show how the history of the subject is a resource for understanding present and perennial problems in moral and political philosophy. This outstanding collection will be of particular interest to historians of moral and political philosophy, historians of ideas, and political scientists. (shrink)

One aim of the Critique of Practical Reason is to establish that reason alone can determine the will. To show that it can, it suffices to show that there are practical principles given by reason alone – what Kant terms ‘practical laws’, or (roughly) requirements of reason on action. Chapter I of the Analytic accomplishes this aim by arguing that the moral law is an authoritative practical principle given as a ‘fact of reason’. The chapter begins in section 1 with (...) a ‘Definition’ (Erklärung) of a practical law as a practical principle that.. (shrink)

The Critique of Practical Reason is the second of Kant's three Critiques, and his second work in moral theory after the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Its systematic account of the authority of moral principles grounded in human autonomy unfolds Kant's considered views on morality and provides the keystone to his philosophical system. The essays in this volume shed light on the principal arguments of the second Critique and explore their relation to Kant's critical philosophy as a whole. They (...) examine the genesis of the Critique, Kant's approach to the authority of the moral law given as a 'fact of reason', the metaphysics of free agency, the account of respect for morality as the moral motive, and questions raised by the 'primacy of practical reason' and the idea of the 'postulates'. Engaging and critical, this volume will be invaluable to advanced students and scholars of Kant and to moral theorists alike. (shrink)

This essay explains Kant’s idea of autonomy of the will and advances a thesis about how it emerges in his moral conception. Kant defines “autonomy” as “the property of the will by which it is a law to itself…” and argues that the Categorical Imperative is that law. I take the autonomy of the will to mean that the nature of rational volition is the source of the formal principle that authoritatively governs rational volition. I give a sense to this (...) idea by pointing to an argument form found throughout the Groundwork and the second Critique where Kant moves from a conception of rational volition as a faculty to a statement of its formal principle. This idea of autonomy emerges in Kant’s moral conception (at the time he writes the Groundwork) as his solution to the problem of moral theory. Common sense assumes that moral requirements apply with unconditional necessity, and the problem of moral theory is to show how such requirements are possible. Kant’s resolution to this problem is to argue that the necessity of moral requirement is genuine only if based in autonomy of the will, only if based in a “law that arises from one’s will”. (shrink)

Kant’s project in ethics is to defend the conception of morality that he takes to be embedded in ordinary thought. The principal aims of his foundational works in ethics – the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason – are to state the fundamental principle of morality, which he terms the “Categorical Imperative”, and then to give an account of its unconditional authority – why we should give moral requirements priority over non-moral reasons – by (...) grounding it in the nature of free rational agency. Roughly the principle of morality gets its authority from the fact that it is by acting from this principle that we exercise our free agency. In these works Kant develops a distinctive account of the content of moral requirement (which is filled out in his later work, The Metaphysics of Morals). According to one version of the Categorical Imperative, we determine what sorts of actions are permissible or required in various situations by asking whether a principle of action is rationally willed as universal law for agents with autonomy. A second version of the Categorical Imperative derives the content of morality from the principle that we are to respect “humanity”, or “rational nature”, as an “end in itself” and never merely as a means. “Humanity” is the capacity for autonomous rational choice, and it includes the capacity to act from one’s own judgment of what one has reason to do, to set ends for oneself, and to guide one’s actions by values one finds it reasonable to accept. To hold that this capacity is an end in itself is to claim that it has an absolute value – a value that Kant terms “dignity” – that sets limits on the.. (shrink)

Kant holds that when an agent acts contrary to a strict moral requirement, all of the resulting bad consequences are imputable to the agent, whether foreseeable or not. Conversely, no bad consequences resulting from an agent's compliance with duty are imputable. This paper analyzes the underlying rationale of Kant's principles for the moral imputation of bad consequences. One aim is to show how Kant treats imputability as a question for practical reason occurring within the context of first-order moral norms, rather (...) than a causal or metaphysical issue. This is because the actions that are candidates for imputation are those picked out as salient by moral norms, and because what is imputable depends on first determining what an agent's moral requirements are. The basic idea behind Kant's principles is that the subject to whom an action or its consequences are imputed is the agent on whose authority the action is undertaken. Bad consequences of an action are imputable to an agent who violates a moral requirement because, in transgressing the limits on action established by morality, the agent acts "on his own authority". Consequences that are unforeseeable or which occur by accident may be imputed by this general principle on these grounds: though the consequences may not have been foreseeable, since the agent was subject to a moral requirement, he had compelling reason to, and thus could have refrained from the action that led to them. Though Kant's principles are generally plausible once their basis is evident, the possibility of bad consequences that are only accidentally connected to a violation of duty indicates the need to set limits on what is imputable. The paper concludes by suggesting that an outcome resulting from a violation of duty is imputable when the requirement under which the agent stands provides a reason to act in ways that will standardly prevent or avoid outcomes of that general kind. Nach Kant werden dem Handelnden, der eine strikte moralische Pflicht verletzt, die schlechten Folgen dieses seines Verhaltens stets zugerechnet, und zwar unabhängig davon, ob diese Folgen nun vorhersehbar waren oder nicht. Umgekehrt: Schlechte Folgen, die aus einem pflichtgemäßen Verhalten hervorgehen, sind nicht zurechenbar. Der Beitrag untersucht das Konzept, das diesen Kantischen Prinzipien für die moralische Zurechnung schlechter Folgen zugrunde liegt. Ein Ziel ist es dabei zu zeigen, wie Kant Zurechenbarkeit nicht als ein metaphysisches oder als ein Problem der Kausalität behandelt, sondern als eine Frage der praktischen Vernunft, die im Zusammenhang mit den moralischen Normen erster Ordnung auftaucht. Dies deshalb, weil die Relevanz der Handlungen, die für die Zurechnung in Frage kommen, in erster Linie von den moralischen Normen herkommt, und weil, was zurechenbar ist, von der vorherigen Bestimmung dessen abhängt, was die moralischen Pflichten des Handelnden sind. Die Grundidee der Kantischen Prinzipien besteht darin, daß das Subjekt, dem eine Handlung oder deren Folgen zugerechnet werden, als Urheber der Handlung betrachtet werden muß. Schlechte Folgen einer Handlung sind einem Handelnden, der eine Pflicht verletzt, deshalb zuzurechnen, weil der Handelnde mit der Überschreitung der von der Moral gesetzten Grenzen "aus eigener Machtvollkommenheit" handelt. Unvorhersehbare oder zufällig eintretende Folgen können unter Zugrundelegung dieses Prinzips aus folgenden Gründen zugerechnet werden: Obwohl die Folgen nicht vorhersehbar gewesen sein mögen, hatte der Handelnde, da er einer moralischen Pflicht unterworfen war, doch einen zwingenden Grund dafür und deshalb auch die Möglichkeit dazu, von der Handlung Abstand zu nehmen, die zu jenen Folgen geführt hat. Wenn Kants Prinzipien, hat man ihre Grundlagen erst einmal verstanden, im allgemeinen auch plausibel sind, ist es doch so, daß die Möglichkeit von schlechten Folgen, die mit einer Pflichtverletzung nur zufälligerweise verknüpft sind, eine Einschränkung der Zurechnung fordert. Der Beitrag schließt mit dem Vorschlag, einen Erfolg, der aus einer Pflichtverletzung resultiert, nur dann zuzurechnen, wenn die moralische Verpflichtung, der der Handelnde unterworfen ist, einen Grund dafür liefert, so zu handeln, daß die Folgen dieses Typs von Handlung normalerweise verhindert oder vermieden werden. (shrink)

Barbara Herman’s The Moral Habitat develops an account of a system of duties – both juridical and ethical, perfect and imperfect – that provides the structure f.

This paper discusses three inter-related themes in Barbara Herman's Moral Literacy norm-constituted power completes’ practical reason or rational agency.

My aim in this paper is to explore different ways of understanding Kant’s Formula of Humanity as a formal principle. I believe that a formal principle for Kant is a principle that is constitutive of some domain of cognition or rational activity. It is a principle that both constitutively guides that activity and serves as its internal regulative norm. In the first section of this essay, I explain why it is desirable to find a way to understand the Formula of (...) Humanity as a formal principle in this sense. In sections II and III I discuss two interpretive approaches to Kant’s idea that rational nature or humanity is an end in itself, both of which may be construed as treating the Formula of Humanity as a formal principle. By focusing on the notion of formal principle, I hope to raise a set of issues about how to understand the idea of rational nature or humanity as an end in itself, and about the relation of the Formula of Humanity [FH] to the Formula of Universal Law [FUL]. I do not resolve the issues in this paper, though I briefly sketch some resolution at the end. (shrink)

Kantians often talk about the capacity to set ends for oneself through reason and those who do assume that Kant regarded the capacity to set ends as a rational power or a component of practical reason. ‘Natural perfection’, Kant says, ‘is the cultivation of any capacities whatever for furthering ends set forth by reason’, and he refers to ‘humanity’ as the ‘capacity to set oneself any end at all’ or ‘the capacity to realize all sorts of possible ends’.¹ ‘Humanity’ comprises (...) the full range of human rational capacities, one of which is the capacity to adopt a wide variety of ends, including ends that are not morally required by pure practical reason.² Likewise Kant refers to ‘culture’ as ‘the aptitude and skill for all sorts of ends for which he can use nature (internal and external)’, or as ‘the production of the aptitude of a rational being for any ends in general (thus those of his freedom).’³ Christine Korsgaard characterizes ‘humanity’ as follows. (shrink)

This study presents a defense of Kant's doctrine of the Highest Good. Though generally greeted with skepticism, I propose an interpretation that makes it an integral part of Kant's moral philosophy, which adds to the latter in interesting ways. Kant introduces the Highest Good as the final end of moral conduct. I argue that it is best understood as an end to be realized in history through human agency: a state of affairs in which all individuals act from the Moral (...) Law, and in doing so achieve their intended ends. Part One is a discussion of the Moral Law oriented towards showing how it can generate a final end. I proceed by showing how Kant's conception of duty and moral conduct incorporates a concern for ends and consequences. Included is a discussion of the concept of the good as object of pure practical reason, which is the basis for the Highest Good in Kant's system. Part Two is a survey of the texts which shows that they in fact contain different versions of the Highest Good. The aim here is an interpretation that states the leading idea and yields a way of saying what is essential. Though the Highest Good is commonly viewed as a theological ideal in which happiness would exist in proportion to virtue, I argue that a complete account can be given, faithful to the texts, in which neither feature appears. Here lies the key to my defense. Standard objections do apply to the Highest Good so conceived. But since neither the theological aspect nor the proportionality of happiness and virtue are essential features of the doctrine, the problems they raise do not affect the doctrine as a whole. Moreover, a secular alternative is found that is more consistent wth Kant's overall conception of moral conduct. It would be characterized by two distinct ends: the moral perfection of all individuals and the satisfaction of their permissible ends. (shrink)

Paul Guyer’s Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness is a collection of essays written over a period of ten years on the roles of freedom, reason, law, and happiness in Kant’s practical philosophy. The centrality of these concepts has always been acknowledged, but Guyer proposes a different way to understand their interconnections. Kant extols respect for moral law and conformity to moral principle for its own sake while at the same time celebrating the value of human freedom and autonomy. Guyer (...) sees tensions between these two poles of Kant’s practical philosophy—obedience to law and the value of freedom. He argues: “A profound paradox can be avoided only if it can be shown that Kant intended obedience to universal law to be mandatory solely as the necessary condition for the realization of human freedom and through that freedom a systematic and unselfish distribution of happiness among all persons” and that “the sheer fact of adherence to universal law is not an end in itself but is rather the means to the realization of the human potential for autonomy or freedom in both choice and action” (p. 1). One guiding theme of Guyer’s book is that Kant’s practical philosophy is based on the fundamental, and hence indemonstrable, intrinsic value of freedom, which Guyer understands as a value that is prior to the moral law, providing both an end to be realized through conformity to universal law and the basis of the authority of moral principles. Conformity to universal law has no intrinsic value in itself; it is the means to the preservation, enhancement, and full realization of human freedom, and is required because of its instrumental connection to the prior value of freedom. As he says, “freedom of choice and its natural expression in action are what human beings value most, and the fundamental principle of morality and the rules for both po-. (shrink)

Andrews Reath presents a selection of his best essays on various features of Kant's moral psychology and moral theory, with particular emphasis on his conception of rational agency and his conception of autonomy. The opening essays explore different elements of Kant's views about motivation, including his account of respect for morality as the distinctive moral motive and his view of the principle of happiness as a representation of the shared structure of non-moral choice. These essays stress the unityof (...) Kant's moral psychology by arguing that moral and non-moral considerations motivate in essentially the same way. Several of the essays develop an original approach to Kant's conception of autonomy that emphasizes the political metaphors found throughout Kant's writings on ethics. They argue that autonomy is best interpreted not as a psychological capacity, but as a kind of sovereignty: in claiming that moral agents have autonomy, Kant regards them as a kind of sovereign legislator with the power to give moral law through their willing. The final essays explore some of theimplications of this conception of autonomy elsewhere in Kant's moral thought, arguing that his Formula of Universal Law uses this conception of autonomy to generate substantive moral principles and exploring the connection between Kantian self-legislation and duties to oneself. The collection offers revised versions of several previously published essays, as well as two new papers, 'Autonomy of the Will as the Foundation of Morality' and 'Agency and Universal Law'. It will be of interest to all students and scholars of Kant, and to many moral philosophers. (shrink)

At least since the late Early Modern period, the Holy Grail of ethics, for many philosophers, has been to say how ethical values could have a kind of protagorean objectivity: values are to be both fully objective as values and yet depend on us by their very nature. More than any other contemporary foundational approach it is “constructivist” theories, such as those due to Rawls, Scanlon, and Korsgaard, which have consciously sought to explain how protagorean objectivity is a real possibility. (...) Yet there remains considerable uncertainty about what the various versions of constructivism have in common, what, if anything, “constructivism” as a general approach is supposed to accomplish, and whether, if it is a general approach, it amounts to a distinctive foundational view. (shrink)

Conscious experiences are characterized by mental qualities, such as those involved in seeing red, feeling pain, or smelling cinnamon. The standard framework for modeling mental qualities represents them via points in geometrical spaces, where distances between points inversely correspond to degrees of phenomenal similarity. This paper argues that the standard framework is structurally inadequate and develops a new framework that is more powerful and flexible. The core problem for the standard framework is that it cannot capture precision structure: for example, (...) consider the phenomenal contrast between seeing an object as crimson in foveal vision versus merely as red in peripheral vision. The solution I favor is to model mental qualities using regions, rather than points. I explain how this seemingly simple formal innovation not only provides a natural way of modeling precision, but also yields a variety of further theoretical fruits: it enables us to formulate novel hypotheses about the space and structures of mental qualities, formally differentiate two dimensions of phenomenal similarity, generate a quantitative model of the phenomenal sorites, and define a measure of discriminatory grain. A noteworthy consequence is that the structure of the mental qualities of conscious experiences is fundamentally different from the structure of the perceptible qualities of external objects. (shrink)

SARGENT A. Nursing Inquiry 2012; 19: 134–143 [Epub ahead of print]Reframing caring as discursive practice: a critical review of conceptual analyses of caring in nursingThis study critically examines the way in which the concept of caring is presented in the nursing literature through conceptual analytic approaches. A critical reflection on the potential consequences of representing a concept of caring as vague and ambiguous, yet central to ontology and epistemology in professional nursing is presented drawing on comparisons between the conceptual analyses (...) of caring, and of structuralist perspectives of language, and how this potentially limits scholarship in this area. A search of the literature revealed nine conceptual papers. These papers highlight the self‐referential characteristics of the concept of caring, and of analytical methods in general. It is proposed that this is the result of a systematic adherence to a rigid, structuralist view of language, whereby stable relationships between words and their meanings are assumed. An alternative perspective is offered by viewing caring as a discursive practice rather than a fixed conceptual entity, calling into question the role that the concept plays in nursing practice. A poststructuralist perspective requires caring to be perceived as a discourse of nursing that is fluid and contingent, rather than a central and guiding concept, opening up a new orientation for nursing scholarship in caring research. (shrink)

Review of Wesley Salmon's Four Decades of Scientific Explanation.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Living into Community: Cultivating Practices That Sustain Us by Christine D. PohlAndrew WattsLiving into Community: Cultivating Practices That Sustain Us CHRISTINE D. POHL Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012. 176 pp. $15.00With Living into Community: Cultivating Practices That Sustain Us, Christine Pohl provides a useful and accessible companion to her first book, Making Room: Recovering Hospitality as a Christian Practice (Eerdmans, 1999). Concerned that “church and culture have (...) not provided the skills or virtues for us to be part of the very communities we long for and try to create” (4), she again challenges the identity of the Christian community. She likewise draws again upon the rich contributions of John Calvin and John Wesley as well as Catholic social movements such as L’Arche as she examines three core practices that engender hospitality: gratitude, promise-keeping, and truth-telling.This book grew out of a grant to participate in the Lilly Endowment project, “Sustaining Pastoral Excellence.” In partnership with her church, Pohl gathered a group of pastors, leaders of intentional communities, and seminary professors to think about gratitude, promise-keeping, truth-telling, and hospitality. The group met for three days twice a year, sharing and reflecting on examples of these practices in their ministries. Pohl provides the practical and theological fruit of their conversations, hoping this work will be used by leaders and members to strengthen their communities. She lays out three sections of three chapters each addressing gratitude, promise-keeping, and truth-telling. Each chapter works from the previous one, examining the practices from historical, biblical, theological, and philosophical perspectives. The last section on hospitality integrates the previous ones rather than simply reworking her previous published material. The book is strengthened by Pohl’s ability to connect together various scholarly and pastoral threads—an ability aided by the practical wisdom of a good working group—to offer helpful practical insights.For example, in the first chapter on gratitude, “Grateful Hearts,” she examines the theological attitudes of gratitude, generosity, and debt contrasted with entitlement and dissatisfaction, or grumbling—ever-present cultural complications for “good” and “holy” communities. In the second section, “Promise-Keeping,” she works through different kinds of promises in order to initiate [End Page 245] the hard work of communal reflection. There, rather than resting in the beautiful but abstract insights of thinkers such as Margaret Farley and Hannah Arendt, she distinguishes contractual and covenantal promises from one another and describes their consequences.Throughout the first two sections, qualities of contemporary culture—individualism, freedom, autonomy, mobility, distrust of institutions—affect and deform the practices of gratitude and promise-keeping essential to healthy and faithful communities. This attention to contemporary culture produces vital insight for the section on promise-keeping: while most Christian organizations appear to operate with covenantal expectations, “we actually work with a hybrid of covenantal and contractual obligations” (78). This “contemporary confusion” can lead to betrayal and loss and impede the mediation of fierce disagreements.Although Pohl provides helpful biblical narrative to support her analysis of each practice, she does not provide an adequate analysis of contemporary culture. One suspects that for Pohl—much like H. Richard Niebuhr—culture exists as a construct external to the well-formed community. It appears responsible for many of the attitudes deforming the essential practices she examines. Yet this suspicion is never fully confirmed, in part because she addresses sin as a present deforming power.Perhaps the most eloquent analysis in the book is found in its discussion of truth-telling. Rather than concede to Augustine’s (theological) or Immanuel Kant’s (rational) prohibition against lying, Pohl turns to Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s invocation of the concrete situation to analyze the practice of truth-telling. Only a community that places truthfulness within the context of covenantal relationships can deal redemptively with deception and wrongdoing. Several of her examples help the reader understand the uniqueness of this practice for healthy communities. [End Page 246]Andrew WattsBelmont UniversityCopyright © 2014 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

This paper critically engages ethical issues in the allocation of novel, and potentially costly, health care resources to patients with disorders of consciousness. First, we review potential benefits of novel health care resources for patients and their families and outline preliminary considerations to address concerns about cost. We then address two problems regarding the allocation of health care resources to patients with disorders of consciousness: (1) the problem of uncertain moral status; and (2) the problem of accurately measuring the welfare (...) burdens these resources would relieve. We conclude by suggesting that opportunity-based frameworks might complement standard approaches for justifying resources allocation to patients with disorders of consciousness. (shrink)

Most work in Kant’s epistemology focuses on what happens “upstream” from experience, prior to the formation of conscious propositional attitudes. By contrast, this essay focuses on what happens "downstream": the formation of assent (Fuerwahrhalten) in its various modes. The mode of assent that Kant calls "Belief" (Glaube) is the main topic: not only moral Belief but also "pragmatic" and "doctrinal" Belief as well. I argue that Kant’s discussion shows that we should reject standard accounts of the extent to which theoretical (...) reason can provide justified assent about things-in-themselves, in favor of one that is much more liberal. Interpretive benefits are not the only results of the discussion, however. I also hope it will become clear along the way that there is such a thing as Kantian Belief, and that we often have quite a lot of it. -/- . (shrink)